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VICARIOUS LIABILITY OF CONTROLLING PERSONS
UNDER THE SECURITIES ACTS
I. INTRODUCTION
The Securities Act of 19331 (1933 Act) and the Securities Exchange
Act of 19342 (1934 Act) regulate a broad range of activities involving the
distribution and subsequent trading of securities, and impose civil liabili-
ty for violation of the Acts and the various rules and regulations promul-
gated thereunder. 3 Liability extends not only to those who are "primari-
ly" responsible for violations, but also to those "controlling" persons
who may be held vicariously liable for the acts of another under section
154 and section 20(a)5 of the 1933 Act and 1934 Act, respectively. The
liability of controlling persons is subject to defenses set forth in sections
15 and 20. Section 15 exonerates a controlling person from liability if he
"had no knowledge of or reasonable ground to believe in the existence of
facts by reason of which the liability of the controlled person is alleged to
exist." 6 Section 20(a) exonerates a controlling person from liability if he
"acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the act or
acts constituting the violation or cause of action." 7
In recent experience, the courts have had to grapple with the question
of whether the controlling persons provisions afford the exclusive means
of imputing liability to the violator's superior, or whether liability under
the Acts can also be predicated upon common law principles of agency
and respondeat superior. In this context, there is an inherent conflict
between common law and securities law principles. The good faith
defenses of the controlling persons provisions are inconsistent with the
principle of absolute liability underlying rules of agency and respondeat
superior. If liability may be predicated on these common law rules under
the securities laws, a principal may be held accountable for the acts of his
1. 15 U.S.C. § 77a-77aa (1970).
2. Id. §8 78a-78hh.
3. For a comprehensive discussion of civil and possible criminal liabilities under the
Securities Acts, see 3 L. Loss, SECURrIES REGULATION 1682 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter
cited as Loss].
4. 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1970).
5. Id. § 78t(a).
6. Id. § 77o.
7. Id. § 78t(a).
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agent without regard to his good faith or lack of reasonable grounds to
know of the facts constituting the violation.
The circuits that have thus far considered this issue have come to
different conclusions. The Fourth and Sixth Circuits have expressly held
that section 20(a) does not limit the availability of agency principles for
attaching secondary liability in cases involving violations of the Securi-
ties Acts.8 The Second, Third, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have adopted a
contrary view by expressly holding that sections 15 and 20(a) are the
exclusive methods of establishing secondary liability.
9
This comment will analyze the legislative intent surrounding sections
15 and 20(a) of the Securities Acts, focusing upon the common law and
statutory controlling persons theories of secondary liability. In so doing,
it will suggest that the better supported view is that the controlling
persons provisions have excluded the application of common law
theories of agency.
II. THE CONTROLLING PERSONS PROVISIONS
A. Section 15 of the 1933 Act
The 1933 Act became effective on July 7, 1933, a date roughly
corresponding to the low point of the stock market, after the 1929
collapse of the securities market.l0 The two principal objectives of the
1933 Act were to protect investors by requiring adequate and accurate
disclosure regarding securities distributed to the public, and to outlaw
fraud in the sale of securities whether or not newly issued.11
In adopting the 1933 Act, Congress recognized that persons other than
primary violators might incur liability. In an effort to deal with so-called
8. Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 297 F. Supp. 1165 (D. Md. 1968), aff'd in part &
rev'd in part, 422 F.2d 1124 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 916 (1974). See also
Armstrong, Jones & Co. v. SEC, 421 F.2d 359 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 958 (1970).
Its counterpart in the 1933 Act, § 15, is treated identically. Kamen & Co. v. Paul H.
Aschkar & Co., 382 F.2d 689, 697 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. dismissed, 393 U.S. 801 (1968).
9. See, e.g., Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976); Zweig
v. Hearst Corp., 521 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975); Lanza v.
Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968); Kamen & Co. v. Paul H. Aschkar & Co., 382 F.2d 689
(9th Cir. 1967), cert. dismissed, 393 U.S. 801 (1968).
10. "The aggregate value of all stocks listed on the NYSE on September 1, 1929, was
$89 billion. . . . In 1932 the aggregate figure was down to $15 billion-a loss of $74 billion
in two and one-half years." I Loss, supra note 3, at 120.
11. The purpose of the 1933 Act is stated in its title to be: "To provide full and fair
disclosure of the character of securities sold in interstate and foreign commerce and
through the mails, and to prevent frauds in the sale thereof, and for other purposes." Ch.
38, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (preamble). See also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195
(1976).
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"secondary participants," the controlling persons sections were added,
imposing joint and several liability upon those who did not participate
directly in the illegal course of conduct, but who otherwise controlled the
primary violator.12 Section 15 of the 1933 Act provides that:
Every person who, by or through stock ownership, agency or
otherwise, or who, pursuant to or in connection with an agreement
or understanding with one or more other persons by or through stock
ownership, agency, or otherwise, controls any person liable under
section 11 or 12, shall also be liable jointly and severally with and to
the same extent as such controlled person to any person to whom
such controlled person is liable, unless the controlling person had no
knowledge of or reasonable ground to believe in the existence of the
facts by reason of which the liability of the controlled person is
alleged to exist.
1 3
This section, which imposes joint and several liability upon controlling
persons 14 originated in the "dummy" provisions of the original Senate
draft of the Act.15
The "dummy" provisions appear to have been intended to prevent
corporate entities from evading liability for securities law violations by
the exercise of power through "dummy" directors.' 6 They provided, in
part, that a "dummy" was "a person who ha[d] nominal power or
authority to act in any capacity but [was] under moral or legal obligation
12. See 77 CONG. REC. 2982 (1933); note 19 infra.
13. 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1970).
14. Section 15 of the 1933 Act applies only where the controlled person has violated §
11 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970), or § 12 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 771(1970).
15. The Senate draft provides:
Every person acquiring any security by reason of any false or deceptive representa-
tion made in the. . . sale. . . offer. . . or distribution of such securities shall have
the right to recover any and all damages . . . from the person or persons signing,
issuing, using or causing, directly or indirectly, such false or deceptive representation.
S. 875, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. § 9 (1933), reprinted in 77 CONG. REc. 2981 (1933).
It should be noted that the specific proscription .of the indirect use of false or deceptive
representations indicates that the provision was intended to encompass the vicarious
nature of a principal's liability for the acts of his agent. The draft further stated:
It shall be unlawful for any person, firm, corporation, or other entity. . . to employ
any "dummy," or to act as any such "dummy," with the intent to defraud or to
obtain money or property by means of any false pretense, representation, or promise,
or to engage in any transaction . . . relating to the . . . purchase or sale of any
securities which operates or would operate as a fraud upon the purchaser. The
director or other person for whom any "dummy" shall act shall be held responsible
under this act for any unlawful conduct by such "dummy."
S. 875, 73d Cong., Ist Sess. § 13 (1933), reprinted in 77 CONG. REC. 2982 (1933).
16. Letter from Commissioner Landis to Senator Fletcher (May 2, 1934), reprinted in 78
CONG. REC. 8717 (1934), stating: "According to the Bar Association report, the proposed
changes which are made in section 15 are intended to make that section applicable only to
prevent the use of dummies in order to evade liability."
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to act therein in accordance with the direction of another."' 7 The rela-
tionship contemplated was one in which one party truly dominated the
actions of the other and liability would arise only when the "dummy"
was "resorted to with fraudulent intent.'
18
Unlike the Senate draft, the House version did not contain either a
"dummy" or a "controlling person" provision, although it proposed the
imposition of liability on directors for false or deceptive representa-
tions. 19 Therefore, when the House and Senate drafts were referred to the
conference committee, the Senate provision relating to "dummies"
became the basis for the present section 15 of the '1933 Act.2 0
The original dummy provisions of the 1933 Act were criticized as
being too drastic and as interfering with honest business.2 In response,
the conference committee replaced the word "director" with the words
"controlling person," deemphasized the requirement of intent to defraud
by adopting the concept of control, and eliminated the word "dummy"
by requiring that section 15 control be exercised over a person liable
under sections 11 or 12.22 This generalization in section 15 of the
previously specific language suggests that the provision was intended to
encompass a broad range of control in a variety of contexts.
17. S. 875, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(k) (1933), reprinted in 77 CONG. REC. 2979 (1933).
This provision provided:
"Dummy" shall mean a person who holds legal or nominal title to any property but is
under moral or legal obligation to recognize another as the owner thereof; or a person
who has nominal power or authority to act in any capacity but is under moral or legal
obligation to act therein in accordance with the direction of another.
18. S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1933). This provision stated in part:
The bill does not attempt to declare the use of "dummy" directors unlawful except
where such use is resorted to with fraudulent intent. It requires the disclosure of the
character of such directors as dummies and for whom they act. . . .The committee
believes that this phase of the law will tend to do away with the present dangerous and
unreliable system of depending upon dummy directors who have no responsibility.
19. H.R. REP. No. 152, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1933).
20. Id.
21. 78 CONG. REC. 8668-69 (1934) (remarks of Senator Fletcher). It was expressed in the
Senate amendment that its purpose was to "restrict the scope of the section so as more
accurately to carry out its real purpose." Id. at 8669.
22. H.R. REP. No. 152, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1933).
Section 11 of the 1933 Act imposes liability for false or misleading statements made in
the registration statement. Its provisions cover a broad range of participants including
directors, underwriters, accountants, appraisers, and others signing or preparing the
registration statement (other than the corporation) who can be held liable. 15 U.S.C. § 77k
(1970).
Section 12 of the 1933 Act imposes liability upon a "person who offers or sells" a
security. 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1970). This language is broad enough to encompass persons
other than the actual vendor of the security such as an agent who "offers or sells" on
behalf of his principal. The courts early progressed to the position that anyone who
"participates" in the sale is liable under this section. 3 Loss, supra note 3, at 1713-15.
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B. Section 20 of the 1934 Act
Whereas the 1933 Act is primarily concerned with the initial distribu-
tion of securities, the 1934 Act is concerned with the post-distribution
process, both on the organized exchanges and in the over-the-counter
markets. The 1934 Act has four basic purposes: (1) to afford a measure
of disclosure to people who buy and sell securities; (2) to afford remedies
for fraud in securities trading and prevent manipulation of the markets;
(3) to regulate the securities market; and (4) to control the amount of the
nation's credit which goes into those markets.
23
The 1934 Act contains a controlling persons provision in section 20
which is similar in effect and purpose to section 15 of the 1933 Act.
Section 20(a) provides:
Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person
liable under any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation
thereunder shall also be liable jointly and severally with and to the
same extent as such controlled person to any person to whom such
controlled person is liable, unless the controlling person acted in
good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts
constituting the violation or cause of action.
24
Section 20(a) was consciously modeled after section 15. As Thomas C.
Corcoran, one of the authors of the 1934 Act, testified before the Senate
Committee on Banking and Currency: "Without reading those para-
graphs [of what is now § 20], the first is taken verbatim from the
Securities Act. The purpose is to prevent evasion of the provisions of the
section by organizing dummies who will undertake the actual things
forbidden by the section."25
The primary difference between the control provisions of the 1933 and
1934 Acts concerns the defenses which they provide to secondary liabili-
ty. The defense contained in section 20(a) exonerates a controlling
person if he "acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce
the act or acts constituting the violation or cause of action. '26 On the
other hand, under section 15, the controlling person must show that he
had no knowledge of, or reasonable ground to believe, that a fraud was
being perpetrated.27
23. S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-5 (1934); see also I Loss, supra note 3, at
130-31.
24. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1970).
25. Hearings on S. Res. 84 (72d Cong.) and S. Res. 56 and 97 (73d Cong.) before the
Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 15, at 6571 (1934).
26. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1970).
27. Id. § 77o.
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Although few cases have interpreted the section 15 defense, the best
construction appears to be that the controlling person must exercise the
"reasonable care" of a "person of ordinary prudence" 28 in order to be
exonerated from liability. This construction implies some burden of
investigation into the activities of the controlled person to determine if
reasonable care has been exercised in light of the facts of each particular
case.
The leading case construing the section 20(a) defense is Lorenz v.
Watson ,29 where a brokerage firm was found liable for failing to ade-
quately supervise its employees. The court held that in order to satisfy the
good faith defense, "it is necessary for the defendants to show that some
precautionary measures were taken to prevent the injury suffered.' '30 A
contrary result "would amount to an invitation to avoid the burden and
responsibility of supervising the activities of one's employees." '31
In summary, under section 15 of the 1933 Act (whose comparable
defense clause was enacted by amendment in 1934 with the adoption of
the 1934 Act) the controlling person must establish that he "had no
knowledge of or reasonable grounds to believe in the existence of the
facts by reason of which the liability of the controlled person is alleged to
exist," whereas under section 20(a) of the 1934 Act the controlling
person need only establish that he "acted in good faith and did not
directly or indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the violation or
cause of action.' '32 The courts have responded with differing views as to
the interpretation of these provisions, and it has been suggested that the
1934 Act gives the controlling person a readier defense than that pro-
vided by the 1933 Act. 33
C. Who are "Controlling Persons"?
Since "control" is not defined under section 15 or 20(a),34 the courts
28. DeMarco v. Edens, 390 F.2d 836, 842-43 (2d Cir. 1968).
29. 258 F. Supp. 724 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
30. Id. at 732.
31. Id. at 733.
32. 3 Loss, supra note 3, at 1747. But see Folk, Civil Liabilities Under the Federal
Securities Acts: The BarChris Case, Part II-The Broader Implications, 55 VA. L. REV.
199, 216-24 (1969).
33. 3 Loss, supra note 3, at 1747.
34. "Control" is not defined, and this was deliberate according to the House Report of
the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce which states:
In this section and section 11, when reference is made to "control," the term is
intended to include actual control as well as what has been called legally enforceable
control. (See Handy & Harmon v. Burnet (1931) 284 U.S. 136). It was thought
undesirable to attempt to define the term. It would be difficult if not impossible to
enumerate or to anticipate the many ways in which actual control may be exerted.
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have responded with vague and uncertain analyses of these provisions.35
In attempting to define what type or quantum of control is necessary to
bring a principal within the purview of the controlling persons provi-
sions, two discernible lines of authority have emerged.36
In general, the definitional problem has been treated as a choice
between two standards: one defines control by status and requires no
affirmative conduct on the part of the controlling person to impose
liability;37 the second requires a showing of control in fact over the
activity, transaction, or institution through which the perpetrator acted.38
.The courts which have followed the status concept focus primarily on
the legal relationship between the alleged controlling person and the
perpetrator of the violation. For example, in Moerman v. Zipco, Inc. ,
in viewing section 20(a), the court reasoned that since a corporation must
be deemed to be in control of its president and since the directors are in
H.R. REP. No. 1383, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1934).
Although "control" is not defined under §§ 15 or 20(a) of the Securities Acts, it is de-
fined with regard to the requirements relating to registration statements: "The term
'control' (including the terms 'controlling,' 'controlled by' and 'under common control
with') means possession, directly or indirectly, of the power to direct or cause the
direction of the management and policies of a person, whether through the ownership of
voting securities, by contract or otherwise." 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2(f) (1977).
35. Some commentators have suggested that the control provisions were promulgated
in an effort to expand the imposition of liability. It was feared that traditional theories of
secondary liability would not prove adequate in extending liability to those actually
responsible for violations of the securities laws. See, e.g., Johns Hopkins Univ. v.
Hutton, 297 F. Supp. 1165, 1211-12 (D. Md. 1968), aff'd on this point, 422 F.2d 1124,1130
(4th Cir. 1970).
Others suggest that the concept of control was left undefined to encompass a large
group of potential offenders since the statutory enactment was intended to preempt other
methods of imposing secondary liability. See, e.g., 78 CONG. REC. 8094-95 (1934) (remarks
of Rep. Hollister).
36. Both lines of authority appear to be compatible with the "directly or indirectly"
language of the controlling persons provisions. See Note, Liability of Controlling Per-
sons-Common Law and Statutory Theories of Secondary Liability, 24 DRAKE L. REV.
621, 630-31 (1975).
37. See Harriman v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 372 F. Supp. 101, 105 (D. Del.
1974); Dyer v. Eastern Trust & Banking Co., 336 F. Supp. 890, 915-16 (N.D. Me. 1971);
Moerman v. Zipco, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 439, 447 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd per curiam, 422
F.2d 871 (2d Cir. 1970).
38. See Sennott v. Rodman & Renshaw, 474 F.2d 32, 39-40 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 926 (1973); Stadia Oil & Uranium Co. v. Wheelis, 251 F.2d 269, 275 (10th Cir. 1957);
Klapmeier v. Telecheck Int'l, Inc., 315 F. Supp. 1360, 1361 (D. Minn. 1970), rev'd on other
grounds, 482 F.2d 247 (8th Cir. 1973).
39. 302 F. Supp. 439 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd per curiam, 422 F.2d 871 (2d Cir. 1970)
(action brought by shareholders against corporation for the fraudulent conduct of corpo-
rate officer who allegedly misrepresented to plaintiff that stock offering was private with a
small group of investors, whereas in fact it was public with a large group of investors).
1977]
158 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11
control of the corporation, the directors would be liable for their presi-
dent's actions unless they sustained the burden of proving that they acted
in good faith.4" When the defendants contended that they could not have
controlled the corporate president because there was no proof that they
were elected directors in accordance with Delaware law, the court re-
sponded that "[t]he conclusion is inescapable that persons who act as
directors are in control of the corporation. This is especially true in light
of the liberal construction of this section as including 'indirect means of
discipline or influence short of actual direction.' "41 Although the con-
trolling defendants prevailed on their good faith defense, the decision
indicates that a legal presumption of control over the institution involved
suffices to establish indirect control over the primary violator.
In the second approach, the courts determine whether actual control is
exerted, considering the facts of each case and all relevant factors
evidencing an exercise of restraint, direction or command.42 This ap-
proach is exemplified by Klapmeier v. Telecheck International, Inc.,43
an action brought to recover for alleged securities violations. In deciding
whether the defendants were controlling persons within the meaning of
section 15, the court noted:
The issue of "control" is a complex fact question which requires
an examination of the relationships of the various alleged "control-
ling persons" to the person or entity which transacted the sale of
securities alleged to have violated the Act, an examination of which
cannot be limited to a cursory review of their proportionate equity
positions, employment or director status on the relevant dates.
While a majority shareholder might as a matter of law be held to
"control" the entity regardless of his actual participation in manage-
ment decisions and the specific transaction in question, the absence
of a substantial ownership of shares does not foreclose liability
under the Act as a "controlling person".
44
While the court recognized that in certain limited circumstances "con-
trol" might arise as a matter of law, the court felt that the issue required a
close analysis of the relationship between the alleged controlling person
and the primary violator.
45
40. Id. at 447.
41. Id. (citation omitted).
42. See note 38 supra.
43. 315 F. Supp. 1360 (D. Minn. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 482 F.2d 247 (8th Cir.
1973) (action brought by shareholders of merged corporation against surviving corporation
and its directors, alleging misrepresentation of the fair market value of corporate assets).
44. Id. at 1361.
45. Id.
LIABILITY OF CONTROLLING PERSONS
On balance, the interpretation which requires a showing of actual
control more accurately reflects the legislative intent. While Congress
devoted only a single paragraph to section 20(a), it noted that "[i]n this
section . . . when reference is made to 'control,' it is intended to include
actual control as well as what has been called legally enforceable con-
trol. "4 Although this language could arguably support either view, it has
been held that Congress envisioned judicial scrutiny of the facts of each
particular case to see if there was sufficient control to impute secondary
liability.4 7 Further, the purpose of the controlling persons provisions
"was obviously to impose liability only on those. . . who fall within its
definition of control and who are in some meaningful sense culpable
participants in the fraud perpetrated by controlled persons. "48 Imposing
secondary liability based solely on status approaches the imposition of
strict liability, even if the available statutory defenses are taken into
consideration. While such liability seems consistent with the broad pur-
poses of the securities laws-to protect the investing public-it is not
warranted by the statutory language. Since the Securities Acts were
intended to represent a dynamic balance between the policy of investor
protection and the legitimate competing interests of honest business,49 the
imposition of liability based solely on status would be at odds with the
remedial purpose of the Acts.
III. COMMON LAW THEORIES OF SECONDARY LIABILITY
In conjunction with the secondary liability imposed by the securities
laws, some courts have continued to impute liability to controlling
persons through common law theories. Under traditional common law
theories, once it is established that an employee's wrongful act was
committed within the scope of his employment, liability is vicariously
imposed upon the employer.50 In direct contrast to the controlling persons
provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts, the employer's personal lack of
culpability does not preclude the imputation of liability.51 Since the
various theories of common law liability are often advanced and con-
sidered together, it is essential to clarify the scope of agency and respon-
deat superior principles before considering whether the controlling per-
46. H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1934).
47. See Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1299 (2d Cir. 1973).
48. Id.
49. See note 112 infra and accompanying text.
50. For a discussion of the common law doctrine with specific reference to the securi-
ties law context, see 3 Loss, supra note 3, at 1431-35.
51. Lewis v. Walston & Co., 487 F.2d 617, 623-24 (5th Cir. 1973).
1977]
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sons provisions have excluded their application for Securities Act viola-
tions.
Agency law imposes liability upon one party for the wrongful acts of
another under a variety of theories. Liability arises whenever a principal
either actually 2 or apparently53 authorizes his agent to make a misrepre-
sentation on his behalf. In the context of securities litigation, the use of
the concepts of actual or apparent authority has led to seemingly harsh
results. 54 As long as a third party reasonably believes from the principal's
conduct that a principal-agent relationship exists, the agent has "appa-
rent authority" and the principal is liable for the agent's acts even though
neither the agent nor the principal is aware of, or intends, the relationship
to exist.55
Since liability in this context is based on the principal's manifestation
of an agent's authority to third parties, the doctrine suffers from two
inherent limitations. First, it is available only to third parties who reason-
ably rely on the agent's authority.56 This limits application of the theory
to persons who transfer securities in a face-to-face market transaction.
Second, even where the cause of action being sued upon is based on a
face-to-face transaction, the plaintiff must make a showing of due dili-
gence. 57 If the plaintiff was aware of, or should have been aware of, the
agent's lack of authority, recovery will be denied.
52. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 257 (1958) provides: "A principal is subject
to liability for loss caused to another by the other's reliance upon a tortious representation
of a servant or other agent, if the representation is: (a) authorized; (b) apparently au-
thorized; or (c) within the power of the agent to make for the principal."
53. Id.
54. An example of this is found in SEC v. First Sec. Co., 463 F.2d 981 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 880 (1972), where liability was imposed through agency theories of
apparent authority. The defendant Nay, president and controlling shareholder of First
Securities, induced fifteen of his clients to invest in a non-existent escrow fund. Each of
the clients received investment advice from Nay in his personal office and knew that he
was president of the defendant company. Although Nay had no actual authority to
facilitate the escrow account, the court found corporate liability by expressly holding that
"[a] principal who puts a servant or other agent in a position which enables the agent,
while apparently acting within his authority, to commit a fraud upon third persons is
subject to liability to such third persons for the fraud." Id. at 985.
55. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 257 (1958), quoted at note 52 supra. The
principal may escape liability under an apparent agency theory if the agent's wrongful acts
are so obviously illegal that any reliance by the plaintiff on the agent's authority would be
clearly unreasonable. Id., Comment a.
56. State and federal courts both require reliance on the apparent authority of an agent
in derivative actions by third parties for securities law violations. See, e.g., Sennott v.
Rodman & Renshaw, 474 F.2d 32 passim (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 926 (1973);
DeMarco v. Edens, 390 F.2d 836, 843 (2d Cir. 1968).
57. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8, Comment a (1958), states that "apparent
authority exists only with regard to those who believe and have reason to believe that
there is authority."
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Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, liability may be imputed to
an innocent principal who has neither actually, impliedly, nor apparently
authorized an agent's misrepresentation, as long as the misrepresentation
is made through "inherent agency power." 5 8 Unlike liability based on
actual or apparent authority, liability under respondeat superior is wholly
independent of the principal's conduct.59 The rationale supporting this
type of liability is derived from commercial-social policy considerations.
As between an innocent principal and an innocent third party, it is felt
that the principal should bear the loss since he initiated the relationship
from which the agent's tort arose. 6 Furthermore, since the principal is
the one who stands to gain from the enterprise, such liability can be
accounted for as a cost of doing business. "Commercial convenience
requires that the principal should not escape liability where there have
been deviations from the usually granted authority by persons who are
• . .essential parts of his business enterprise. "61
Unlike the exculpatory defenses available under the controlling per-
sons provisions, both agency and respondeat superior theories limit
defenses to the lack of an express or apparent agency relationship with
the principal.6' Furthermore, the courts that have considered the issue
have noted that the "lack of agency" defense is narrowly construed and
must be clearly demonstrated.
63
58. "Inherent agency power" exists when representations are made by the agent during
the performance of his duties and within the scope of his authority. Id. § 8A.
"Inherent agency power" is the equivalent of respondeat superior liability as applied to
the master-servant relationship, and the terms are often used interchangeably. Id.
59. Id. § 161, Comment a provides that inherent agency powers are
[p] owers held by an agent, the exercise of which are effective to subject the principal
to liability in transactions in which the agent has neither authority nor apparent
authority, but in which the agent derives his power wholly from his relation with the
principal. They are called inherent agency powers since there is no other common
designation which adequately describes them.
60. Id. § 161.
61. Id.
62. Id. § 15 provides that "[a]n agency relationship exists only if there has been a
manifestation by the principal to the agent that the agent may act on his account, and
consent by the agent so to act."
63. In Sennott v. Rodman & Renshaw, 474 F.2d 32 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 926
(1973), a commodities trader brought suit alleging fraudulent securities. manipulation by a
son of a partner in a securities brokerage firm. Although the son, a previous associate, was
not employed by the firm, he did use the firm's phone on the trading floor. The court of
appeals, after reviewing the evidence, found sufficient facts to disprove the agency
relationship. The court concluded that without a showing that a partner or agent of the
brokerage firm had knowledge of the fraudulent acts of such former associate, and in the
absence of a showing that the former associate was purporting to act for the brokerage
firm, there was no basis for holding the brokerage firm liable for the resulting damages.
Id. at 39-40.
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IV. STATUTORY LIABILITY AND THE COMMON LAW DOCTRINES
Although the courts which have ruled on the issue have generally
allowed injured investors to recover from principals for losses they
incurred as a result of the securities law violations of their agents, no
single theory of recovery has been applied. 64 The judiciary has continued
to borrow from common law theories in spite of the specific provisions of
the Securities Acts. The primary sources of this "borrowing" have been
theories of agency, aiding and abetting, and conspiracy. 65 The courts
64. See Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abet-
ting, Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto, Indemnification, and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REV.
597 (1972).
65. To impose liability as an aider and abettor under § 876(b) of the Restatement of
Torts, it is necessary to find three distinct elements: first, the existence of an independent
wrongful act; second, knowledge by the aider and abettor of that wrongful act; and third,
substantial assistance in effecting that wrongful act. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 876(b)
(1939). Therefore, the person who is primarily liable must have violated a securities law,
and the alleged aider and abettor must have known of this violation and by his conduct
substantially assisted the primary violator in carrying out the unlawful scheme. Id.
Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 989 (1970), is an example of a securities case dealing with secondary liability in
accord with the Restatement view. Brennan involved a class action by purchasers of stock
of the defendant corporation who had purchased shares from Dobich Securities (a securi-
ties dealer) but had never actually received delivery of the share certificates. The action
was to recover from the corporation for allegedly aiding, abetting and assisting the
securities dealer in fraudulently converting the customers' money. The plaintiffs alleged
that although they had notified the corporation of the unexplained delay in the delivery
of their stock, the corporation failed to act, possibly because' it was in the midst of a
merger and leaking such information would materially affect its stock's value. Id. at
151. The lower court, while basing its finding of liability on tort principles, rejected a claim
that Congres§ had by implication excluded aiding and abetting activities from coverage of
the securities laws by stating:
In the absence of a clear legislative expression to the contrary, the statute must be
flexibly applied so as to implement its policies and purposes. In this regard, it cannot
be said that civil liabilities for damages, so well established under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, may never under any circumstances be imposed upon persons
who do no more than aid and abet a violation of Section 10(b) and Rule lob-5.
259 F. Supp. 673, 680-81 (N.D. Ind. 1966).
The Seventh Circuit approved the lower court's decision by holding that a secondary
defendant may be liable for giving affirmative and knowing assistance to a third party
engaged in fraudulent activity which violates the securities laws. However, the court
failed to discuss at what point the secondary defendant's knowledge was enough for the
imposition of liability. 417 F.2d at 154-55. The court's position has been reaffirmed, in a
subsequent decision where it was held that liability for aiding and abetting may be
predicated on less than actual knowledge of the illegal activity. See Buttrey v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 410 F.2d 135 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 838
(1969). It appears however that the amount of knowledge required will vary with the facts
of each particular case. As one commentator has stated:
Some link, then, between defendants is essential unless vicarious liability is to lie for
purely coincidental actions. It does not matter greatly what we call the link: agree-
ment, understanding, combination, concert, mutual authorization, joint action or
something else. The need is substantially the same whether we classify the defendants
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have come to divergent conclusions: the older decisions indicated that
liability under the Securities Acts did not supplant theories of common
law liability;66 the modern trend supports the view that liability under the
Securities Acts is the exclusive determinant of secondary liability. 67
A. Cases Imputing Liability on the Basis of Agency Principles
Probably the most lucid Securities Act decision applying agency prin-
ciples rather than the controlling persons provisions is the Fourth Cir-
cuit's decision in Johns Hopkins University v. Hutton.68 In Johns Hop-
kins suit was brought against W.E. Hutton & Co. to rescind the Univer-
sity's purchase of an oil and gas production payment on the ground that a
Hutton employee had falsely predicted future net revenues for the oil
wells. Hutton had been employed by Trice Production Company at a two
percent commission to act as a broker and agent in the sale of production
payments on oil properties owned by Trice. Hutton, acting through
LaPiere, the manager of Hutton's oil and gas department, began negotia-
tions with Johns Hopkins for the sale of one of the production payments.
During the negotiations LaPiere concealed several surveys reflecting a
more conservative estimate of the amount of oil in the reserves than those
surveys actually presented to the University. 69 Additionally, it was al-
leged that oral representations made.by LaPiere inflated estimates of the
amount of return that could be expected on a production payment.70
Johns Hopkins subsequently learned that substantially lower oil reserves
and returns on its investment could be expected-than those represented by
LaPiere and an action was brought to rescind the transaction under
section 12(2) of the 1933 Act. 7'
as participants, aider-abettors or conspirators. Certainly no formal agreement is
necessary to forge the link, and a tacit understanding will suffice.
The link, if not directly proved, may be inferred from parallel or complementary
acts, prior relationships, common benefits, interchange of communications or other
relevant factors.
3 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD § 8.5, at 208.41 n.581 (1977).
66. See Armstrong, Jones & Co. v. SEC, 421 F.2d 359 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S.
958 (1970); Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 297 F. Supp. 1165 (D. Md.'1968), aff'd in part
& rev'd in part, 422 F.2d 1124 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 916 (1974).
67. See, e.g., SEC v. First Sec. Co., 463 F.2d 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 880
(1972); Jackson v. Bache & Co., 381 F. Supp. 71 (N.D. Cal. 1974); Gorden v. Burr, 366 F.
Supp. 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), modified on other grounds, 506 F.2d 1080 (2d Cir. 1974); SEC
v. Lum's, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1046 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Anderson v. Francis I. duPont & Co.,
291 F. Supp. 705 (D. Minn. 1968); Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417 (N.D.
Cal. 1968), modified on other grounds, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970).
68. 297 F. Supp. 1165 (D. Md. 1968), aff'd in part & rev'd in part, 422 F.2d 1124 (4th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 916 (1974).
69. 297 F. Supp. at 1197.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1211.
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Although the defendants did not urge the district court to consult the
exculpatory language of section 15, it undertook sua sponte to analyze
the section 15 question at length. 72 The district court first stated that it did
not "believe that Section 15, relating to 'controlling' persons, applie[d]
to the employer (brokerage house)-employee relationship." 73 Second-
ly, it noted that cases which had considered the application of section 15
did not "indicate in any way that Section 15, and more particularly the
'unless' provision thereof, ha[d] any application to the liability of a
brokerage house for acts or omissions of its employees. Rather, Section
15 ha[d] been applied in other contexts." 74 The court continued by
stating:
The legislative history and case law, to the extent there is any, would
appear to buttress a construction of Section 15 to exclude applica-
tion of the latter to an employment relationship. A contrary conclu-
sion would in effect give blessing to a hear-no-evil, see-no-evil
approach by partners of a brokerage house which is hardly in keep-
ing with the remedial purposes of the '33 Act.
75
Thirdly, after interpreting the legislative history, it was reasoned that
Congress had not intended section 15 to be a limitation on liability;
rather, the section had been designed "to establish a 'controlling person'
liability which would supplement, and extend beyond, common law
principles of agency and respondeat superior."76 Relying on the lower
court's rationale, the appellate court concluded that "Hutton is liable,
under familiar principles, for the tortious representations of its agents,"
and cited sections of the Restatement of Agency to support its conclu-
sions .7
Although the court's decision has been referred to as "the most
researched opinion in this area," 7 8 it leaves the applicability of section 15
uncertain. It is not clear whether the court meant that the control provi-
sions did not apply in a broker-dealer context, or that they did not apply
only to employer-employee relationships or to employer-employee rela-
tionships between a broker and its representatives. It is difficult to
reconcile the fine lines the court attempted to draw between these various
72. The court was probably influenced by the fact that certiorari had been granted in
Kamen & Co. v. Paul H. Aschkar & Co., 382 F.2d 689 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 390 U.S.
942 (1967), cert. dismissed, 393 U.S. 801 (1968).
73. 297 F. Supp. at 1211.
74. Id. at 1212.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. 422 F.2d at 1130 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 257-258 (1958)).
78. SEC v. Lum's, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1046, 1062 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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types of relationships. The defenses of the controlling persons provisions
would be of no avail where securities law liability could be based on a
principal-agent relationship by means of common law theories.
In Armstrong, Jones & Co. v. SEC, 79 an action was brought against a
brokerage firm and its chairman for violations of various sections of the
1933 and the 1934 Acts. It was alleged that the company had sold stock
of the Alexander Hamilton Life Insurance Company, a Michigan corpo-
ration, for which it had claimed an intrastate exemption from registra-
tion, to nonresidents of Michigan when it knew or should have known
that some of the actual purchasers of the initial offering were in fact
nonresidents. Armstrong, the chairman, contended that in order to be
held liable for the wrongful conduct of his employees, the court would
have to find that there was a lack of adequate supervision, which is a
ground for remedial action under section 15(b)(5)(E) of the 1934 Act.8"
Further, it was argued that the company could not be found to have
willfully violated the fraudulent representation provisions because of the
unauthorized acts of its agents.81 The court countered by rejecting these
contentions and noted that "[lit has long been the position of the Com-
mission that a broker-dealer may be sanctioned for the wilful violations
of its agents under the doctrine of respondeat superior."8 2 Without
offering any rationale for its decision, the court disallowed application of
the exculpatory defenses of the control provisions to the finding that the
acts of the agents were unauthorized, and held the company strictly liable
on common law principles of agency and respondeat superior.
These cases and others in the Fourth and Sixth Circuits represent the
only decisions which have expressly held that sections 15 and 20 do not
limit the availability of agency principles for imputing secondary liability
in cases involving violations of the Securities Acts. Additionally, the
Fifth Circuit has adopted a similar approach sub silentio in Lewis v.
Walston & Co.
83
B. Cases Adopting the Exclusivity View of
Sections 15 and 20(a)
The forerunner of a series of cases in the various circuits concerning
liability of an employer for Securities Act violations of its employees is
79. 421 F.2d 359 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 958 (1970).
80. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(5)(E) (1970).
81. 421 F.2d at 362.
82. Id.
83. 487 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1973). In an action brought against a broker and its registered
representative alleging misrepresentations, the court, without discussing § 20 liability,
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Kamen & Co. v. Paul H. Aschkar & Co.,84 a Ninth Circuit opinion
considering the interplay between California agency principles and the
federal securities laws. In Kamen, plaintiff Paul H. Aschkar & Co., a
member firm of the New York and American Stock Exchanges, was
approached by two individuals, Ross and Grossinger, with a plan cal-
culated to increase the firm's commission business by obtaining the listed
business of broker-dealers who were not members of either exchange.
Kamen & Co. thereupon established a new broker-dealer division and
placed Ross and Grossinger in charge with the authority to place over-
the-counter orders with nonmember broker-dealers. The plan was to offer
various special services, such as free long distance telephone service on
listed stock quotations and orders, free access to the analyses of stock
specialists, and free research material from various companies, in return
for which the broker-dealers would provide Kamen & Co. with their
"listed" business.
Unknown to Kamen & Co., Ross and Grossinger while in the employ
of the firm had used their offices and facilities to initiate a fraudulent
scheme to create a market for a quantity of worthless nonlisted stock. The
modus operandi of the scheme was simple enough: nonmember broker-
dealers were contacted and requested to purchase or sell listed securities
through Kamen & Co. in return for which they would receive its nonlist-
ed securities business. A second dealer would be contacted and requested
to purchase the stock from the first dealer at a specified price to be sold to
a third broker, and so on. By arranging a series of purchases and sales,
Ross and Grossinger were able to create an artificial market and collect
commissions from the transactions.
The plaintiff Paul H. Aschkar & Co., one of the dealers who fell prey
to the scheme, was induced to purchase a quantity of the worthless stock
at one price with the expectation of selling it to another "pre-arranged"
broker-dealer at a profit. When the Ross and Grossinger scheme col-
lapsed, Paul H. Aschkar & Co. was unable to sell the stock and upon
discovering the fraudulent operation, sued to recover the purchase price
of $24,875 from Kamen & Co. The plaintiff contended that both the
brokerage house and its employees had violated section 12(2) of the 1933
Act85 by inducing the purchase of worthless securities. Further, it was
concluded that Walston & Co. was liable for the acts of its representative made within the
scope of her employment, citing the Restatement of Agency for support. Id. at 623.
84. 382 F.2d 689 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 390 U.S. 942 (1967), cert. dismissed, 393 U.S.
801 (1968).
85. Paul H. Aschkar & Co. v. Kamen & Co., [1964-1965 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 91,565, at 95,135 (S.D. Cal. 1964). Section 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1970)
imposes liability for misrepresentation on sellers of securities.
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alleged that the brokerage house was liable on the basis of common law
principles of agency concerning the liability of a principal for the misrep-
resentations of its agents.86
The trial court found that Kamen & Co. had neither known, nor had
reason to know, of its employees' fraud, and had, moreover, exercised
due care in selecting and supervising its employees.8 7 Although Kamen
& Co. was exonerated from liability as a "controlling person," the trial
court predicated liability on the state law claims through agency princi-
ples.88 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, applying California law, held
that the finding that the brokers had ostensible authority to. make the
fraudulent representations was "clearly erroneous" since Kamen & Co.
was "neither a participant, directly or indirectly, in the fraudulent ac-
tivities of Ross and Grossinger, nor did Kamen have any reasonable
ground for believing such activities were taking place.' '89
In the court's view, a controlling person could be exonerated from
liability on two possible grounds: (1) under the 1934 Act, if the control-
ling person acted in good faith and had not directly or indirectly induced
the fraudulent conduct; or (2) under the comparable provision of the 1933
Act, if he had not participated either directly or indirectly in the fraudu-
lent conduct and had not had reasonable grounds to believe that such
conduct was taking place..9 The court further reasoned that "[t]he pro-
posed guaranteed profit sales so far departed from propriety and were
patently of a sufficiently unusual nature in the light of Aschkar's knowl-
edge and experience as to put him on warning and require him to take
some steps to inquire into the extent of authority of the agent." 91 The
court concluded by rejecting common law bases of liability as being
inconsistent with the good faith defenses provided by the control provi-
sions.
92
A subsequent Ninth Circuit decision, Zweig v. Hearst Corp.,93
reiterated the proposition that the controlling persons section of the 1934
Act affords the exclusive basis for imputing liability for Securities Act
violations. In Zweig, actions were brought against a newspaper publisher
to recover for alleged violations of the 1934 Act in connection with the
86. [1964-1965 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 191,565, at 95,135.
87. Id. at 95,137.
88. Id. at 95,139.
89. 382 F.2d at 697.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 696.
92. Id. at 697.
93. 521 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975).
1977]
168 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11
publication of a financial column authored by a newspaper employee.
The author of the article had been a reliable employee of the newspaper
for approximately thirty years and was in charge of the financial column
which was published daily. The article was laudatory of a publicly held
corporation in which the columnist held some stock-a fact which was
undisclosed. Subsequent to the publication of the column, the price of the
corporation's stock sky-rocketed, at which time the financial writer
disposed of some or all of his siock at this higher price. The stock soon
declined sharply in price at which time action was brought against both
the columnist and the publisher by a number of persons who claimed
pecuniary damage as a result of the publication of the newspaper story.
The plaintiffs alleged that the author's failure to disclose his financial
interest in the corporation constituted a violation of section 10(b) of the
1934 Act. 94 Further, the plaintiffs contended that Hearst should be held
vicariously liable through common law agency principles for the fraudu-
lent acts of his employee. 95 Relying on the rule of Kamen, the court held
that no liability would attach under the doctrine of respondeat superior
and that "as to Hearst, liability, if any, was as a controlling person under
Section 20(a)."96
One of the best reasoned decisions considering the vicarious liability
of a broker for the acts of his agent is Jackson v. Bache & Co. 97 In
Jackson, plaintiff investors sought to recover against defendant bro-
kerage firm and its registered representative for alleged violations of the
1934 Act. The plaintiffs claimed that the representative of the firm had
been touting stock in a company known as Medical Logistics without
having made an adequate investigation of the background and financial
stability of the company. The 'plaintiffs contended that they invested
large sums of money in the corporation which was represented as pros-
pering, only to find that those representations were false.
In discussing the liability of the brokerage firm, the court looked to the
position adopted by the court in Kamen and the intent of Congress in
enacting section 20. The court noted that the legislative intent behind
section 20 was essentially twofold: (1) to maximize the coverage of the
Act by extending liability to even those persons having mere control; and
(2) to introduce culpability or lack of good faith as an element necessary
to permit recovery. 98 Recognizing that section 20's broad concept of
94. Id. at 1131.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1133.
97. 381 F. Supp. 71 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
98. Id. at 95.
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control would always include those liable under the theory of re.spondeat
superior, the court refused to impute liability to the brokerage firm under
agency principles by noting that "if agency principles were adopted the
good faith defense specifically contained in section 20 would be emas-
culated." 99 The court concluded by noting that "[t]o superimpose agen-
cy law over Section 20 would be to create a strict liability standard-a
standard specifically rejected by Congress when Section 20 was
adopted.' " 0o
The Jackson Court thus reasoned that: (1) the controlling persons
sections impose liability upon a larger group of persons than does the law
of agency; 1"' and (2) to compensate for the increased exposure to liabili-
ty, certain defenses are available to controlling persons which are not
available to persons found to be principals through agency-respondeat
superior analysis.
0 2
Also following Kamen is SEC v. Lum's, Inc.,"°3 an enforcement
proceeding brought under rule lOb-5. The plaintiff alleged that Melvin
Chasen, the chief operating officer and director of Lum's, had received a
non-public, pessimistic earnings projection which was contrary to the
earnings projections previously released by the company. Chasen relayed
these undisclosed projections to Simon, who was a registered representa-
tive and institutional salesman for defendant Lehman Brothers, a regis-
tered broker-dealer. Simon, in turn, passed the information on to two of
his institutional customers who were managers of a number of mutual
funds. Acting upon this information, the customers quickly sold out their
entire positions in Lum's common stock.
The Commission charged that Lehman Brothers had breached its duty
to supervise its representatives by permitting Simon to maintain inside
contacts with Lum's while his clients held large quantities of Lum's
stock. Further, it contended that not only was Lehman Brothers liable for
a failure to supervise, but was also vicariously liable through the com-
mon law principle of respondeat superior. "[A] fraud violation by an
officer or employee of a broker-dealer acting within the scope of his
employment," the Commission argued, "is necessarily a violation of the
broker-dealer itself and the degree of fault of the broker-dealer is a factor
which should be considered only in determining the sanction to be
imposed." 1°
99. Id. (footnote omitted).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. 365 F. Supp. 1046 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
104. Id. at 1061-62.
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The court refused to follow the Commission's position or that of Johns
Hopkins. 10 Although the employee was held personally liable, Lehman
Brothers was exonerated from liability since the court reasoned that
application of respondeat superior did "violence" to the legislative
intent underlying the 1934 Act. The court focused upon Lanza v. Drexel
& Co.,10 7 a Second Circuit decision which had approved Kamen's
analysis of a broker-dealer's liability under the control provisions.
10 8
Specifically rejecting the Commission's position, the court concluded
that section 20(a) was the exclusive standard for determining vicarious
liability. 9 After noting that "every violation. . . by a salesman does
not necessarily imply a breach of the employer's duty to supervise,
110
the court released Lehman Brothers from liability on the basis of its
"good faith" defense that it neither induced the employee to commit the
fraudulent acts nor was negligent in failing to supervise him adequately.
V. CONTROLLING PERSONS PROVISIONS-THE EXCLUSIVE
DETERMINANT OF VICARIoUS LIABILITY
UNDER THE SECURITIES ACTS
Although several courts have allowed the use of agency principles as a
method of imputing vicarious liability to brokerage firms for the securi-
ties violations of their employees,"' the better reasoned view is that the
controlling persons provisions supplant agency liability for such viola-
tions. Support for the latter position may be found in the legislative
history of the Securities Acts, the statutory language of the controlling
persons provisions, and a variety of cases suggesting possible policy
considerations.
A. Legislative History of the Securities Acts
In proposing the passage of the 1934 Act to Congress, President
Roosevelt stated that "[t]he purpose of the legislation I suggest is to
protect the public with the least possible interference to honest busi-
105. Id. at 1062.
106. Id. at 1063.
107. 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973).
108. 365 F. Supp. at 1063.
109. Id. at 1062-64. This view was subsequently adopted in Sanders v. Lum's, Inc.,
[Current Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,020 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), where a private
action was brought for damages resulting from the same occurrence involved in the
injunctive proceeding instituted by the SEC.
110. 365 F. Supp. at 1064.
111. See notes 68-83 supra and accompanying text.
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ness." 2 Although the message seemed rhetorically clear, its interpreta-
tion led to a bitter struggle between members of the Conference Commit-
tee of the House and Senate. The ensuing debate concerned the extent of
the civil liability that should be imposed upon controlling persons for
securities violations. The Senate bill imposed a liability that was akin to
that of "insurer's liability:"
Every person acquiring any securities specified in such statement
and offered to the public shall be presumed to rely upon the repre-
sentations set forth in the said statement. In case any such registra-
tion statement shall be false or deceptive in any material respect, any
persons acquiring any securities to which such statement relates,
either from the originial [sic] issuer or from any other person, shall
have the right to rescind the transaction and to obtain the return,
either at law or in equity, of any and all consideration given or paid
for any such securities upon the surrender thereof, either from any
vendor knowing of such falsity or from the persons signing such
statement, jointly or severally."
3
The Senate committee explained that the strict obligations the bill im-
posed represented a balance between protection of the public and possi-
ble interference with honest business, but, in reality, the bill "denied any
weight to the latter interest." 114 The committee stated that it
ha[d] been confronted with the problem of the contrasted equities
where untrue information as to material facts shall be given in any
registration statement upon which the buyer presumably relies. This
goes to the essence of the relief to the public. Shall the signers on
behalf of the corporation be exempt from liability if it cannot be
shown that they knew of the false or erroneous character of the
representations made?
The question is whether ignorance of an untruth should excuse the
director and leave the loss upon the buyer. To do so in our opinion
would fail to give the buyer the needed relief and fail to restore
confidence. If one of two presumably innocent persons must bear a
loss, it is familiar legal principle that he should bear it who has the
opportunity to learn the truth and has allowed untruths to be published
and relied upon." 5
The House bill, on the other hand, measured liability for untrue
statements in terms of "reasonable care.""1 6 The reasonable care stan-
112. Letter From Franklin D. Roosevelt to Congress (March 29, 1933), S. REP. No. 47,
73d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1933), reprinted in 77 CONG. REC. 937 (1933).
113. S. 875, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. § 9 (1933), reprinted in 77 CONG. REC. 2981 (1933).
114. Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1295 (2d Cir. 1973).
115. S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1933).
116. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 5, 9-10 (1933).
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dard was expressed in terms of a fiduciary relationship.1 7 The bill
recognized that it would be reasonable to allow a fiduciary to delegate the
performance of certain acts to others, especially where professional skills
or facilities not possessed by the fiduciary himself were called for."18 In
such cases reasonable reliance by the fiduciary on the apparent skills of
another would be a full discharge of his duties. The House report stated:
The demands of this bill call for the assumption of no impossible
burden, nor do they involve any leap into the dark.
The responsibility imposed is no more nor less than that of a trust. It
is a responsibility that no honest banker and no honest businessman
should seek to avoid or fear. To impose a lesser responsibility would
nullify the purposes of this legislation. To impose a greater responsi-
bility, apart from constitutional doubts, would unnecessarily restrain
the conscientious administration of honest business with no com-
pensating advantage to the public.119
In choosing between these two standards of secondary liability, the
Senate accepted the standards imposed by the House bill, leading to the
following conclusion:
The intent of Congress in adding this Section [20], passed at the
same time as the amendment to Section 15 of the 1933 Act, was
obviously to impose liability only on those. . . who fall within its
definition of control and who are in some meaningful sense culpable
participants in the fraud perpetrated by controlled persons.
12
As evidenced by the debates surrounding the enactment of the 1934
Act, "insurer's liability" was felt to be decidedly inappropriate. Not
only would this call for the assumption of an "impossible burden," but
liability would be imposed irrespective of one's personal culpability.
Imposing liability by means of agency principles on controlling per-
sons who could not have prevented the wrongful acts giving rise to such
liability runs counter to the notions adopted by the House and Senate
committees. The standard of secondary liability adopted presupposed
some degree of fault on the part of a controlling person, and the statutory
defenses simply operate as a shield against such liability where there is
no culpable conduct. 121 Furthermore, recent decisions by the Supreme
117. Id. atS.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 5, 9-10.
120. Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1299 (2d Cir. 1973).
121. See also Comment, Brokerage Firm's Liability for Salesman's Fraudulent Prac-
tices, 36 FORDHAM L. REv. 95, 97 (1967).
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Court suggest that the imposition of liability for non-intentional conduct
is inappropriate in the context of securities litigation.' 22
B. The Language of the Control Provisions
The court in Johns Hopkins imputed liability on agency theories,
reasoning that section 15 did not have "any application to the liability of
a brokerage house for acts or omissions of its employees. Rather, Section
15 has been applied in other contexts." ' 12 However, the statutory lan-
guage of the controlling persons provisions, 24 as amplified in other
decisions,"2 suggests that this line of decisions is without firm support.
First, Johns Hopkins ignores the relatively numerous cases applying
the control provisions to establish liability of broker-dealers for the acts
of their employees. 126 Secondly, upon careful examination, the control-
ling persons provisions would seem to cover the broker-employee situa-
tion since section 20(a) applies to "every person, who directly or indi-
rectly, controls any person liable under any provision of this chapter or of
any rule or regulation thereunder,"' 27 and section 15 applies to "every
person who, by or through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise...
controls any person liable under sections 77k or 771 . . '128
The use of the word "agency" in section 15 of the Act lends support to
the proposition that Congress intended to supplant common law agency
principles of secondary liability. Neither agency nor any other relation-
ship is specified in section 20(a), an omission which seems to be inten-
tional, since the drafters of the section have stated: "In this section...
when reference is made to control, the term is intended to include actual
control as well as what has been called legally enforceable control.'
129
Since control has been interpreted as requiring only some indirect means
of discipline or influence short of actual direction, 30 it would seem that
122. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
123. See notes 73-75 supra and accompanying text.
124. See notes 34-38 supra and accompanying text.
125. See notes 84-110 supra and accompanying text.
126. See, e.g., Richardson v. MacArthur, 451 F.2d 35 (10th Cir. 1971); Douglass v.
Glenn E. Hinton Invs., Inc., 440 F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 1971); Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co.,
430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 951 (1968).
127. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1970).
128. Id. § 77o.
129. H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1934). See Handy & Harman v.
Burnet, 284 U.S. 136 (1931), for a discussion of what has been called "legally enforceable
control."
130. See, e.g., Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951
(1968). The court, in discussing the congressional policy calling for a broad definition of
"control," stated that "[t]he statute is remedial and is to be construed liberally. It has
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the regulatory goals of the SEC could be substantially achieved without
attempting to read a non-existent insurer's liability into the statute on the
basis of agency theories.
131
It is ludicrous to suggest that the legislature would have gone to such
extreme measures in enacting the control provisions only to have their
efforts rendered nugatory by allowing strict liability to be imputed under
common law principles of agency. Since section 15 specifically defines
"control" with reference to the term "agency" and a House report
indicates a similar construction of section 20,132 the controlling persons
provisions of the Acts should squarely exclude the application of com-
mon law principles of agency in cases brought under the Federal Securi-
ties Acts.
C. Statutory Considerations Supportive of the
Exclusivity Position of Sections 15 and 20(a)
The Supreme Court in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder 33 has recently
adopted the view that the imposition of liability for non-intentional
conduct is inappropriate under the Securities Acts. In Hochfelder, the
degree of culpability required for the imposition of liability under rule
lOb-5 was considered., Customers of a brokerage firm who had invested
in a fraudulent investment scheme brought an action against the account-
ing firm responsible for auditing the brokerage firm's books. The plain-
tiffs alleged that the fraudulent act of the brokerage firm's president had
been in violation of rule lOb-5 and that the accounting firm had aided and
abetted in the violation by failing to conduct proper audits, thereby
preventing discovery of the fraudulent scheme.134
In deciding whether negligence was a proper standard for imputing
secondary liability through a private cause of action, the Court looked to
the legislative intent surrounding the 1934 Act. Although rule lOb-5 was
intended as a catch-all provision enabling the Securities and Exchange
Commission to deal with "new manipulative or cunning devices," 135 it
was noted that "[n]either the legislative history nor the briefs supporting
respondents identify any usage or authority for construing 'manipulative
been interpreted as requiring only some indirect means of discipline or influence short of
actual direction to hold a controlling person liable." Id. at 738 (citations omitted).
131. See notes 113-20 supra and accompanying text (the Senate's "insurer's liability"
provision was expressly rejected by Congress when the 1934 Act was enacted).
132. H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1934).
133. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
134. Id. at 189-90.
135. Id. at 203.
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[or cunning] devices' to include negligence." ' 36 Commenting on the
express civil liabilities provided, the Court stated: "There is no indica-
tion that Congress intended anyone to be made liable for such practices
unless he acted other than in good faith. The catchall provision of §
10(b) should be interpreted no more broadly."
137
The Court also affirmed that "the interdependence of the various
sections of the securities laws is certainly a relevant factor in any
interpretation of the language Congress has chosen . ... 138 After
reviewing the administrative history of various sections of the 1934 Act,
the Court held that rule lOb-5 was intended to apply only to activities that
involved some form of scienter or a state of mind embracing intent to
deceive, manipulate, or defraud. 139
Hochfelder signals the Court's receptiveness to the proposition that the
defenses contained in the controlling persons provisions should be avail-
able to defendants in securities actions. Further, there is no reason to
believe that Congress intended the imputation of vicarious liability absent
the element of personal culpability. 14° Liability cannot be imposed in
disregard of the delicate policy balance between investor protection and
honest business which underlies the federal securities enactments. 
141
Due to the enormity of potential damages recoverable for securities
law violations,142 imposing liability regardless of personal culpability
places an undue burden on honest business in opposition to the congres-
sional intent surrounding the enactments. In Hochfelder, the Court re-
versed its expansive trend and adopted a more restrictive interpretation in
lOb-5 actions. Since negligence alone is not a sufficient showing of
culpability, the case represents a shift away from a strict liability stan-
dard, opposing the type of absolute liability that would be imposed by
common law agency principles. To paraphrase Judge Friendly's famous
assertion, the consequences of a contrary conclusion are frightening. 43
136. Id. (footnote omitted).
137. Id. at 206.
138. Id. (quoting SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 466 (1969)).
139. Id. at 193.
140. Id. at 206.
141. See note 112 supra and accompanying text.
142. Had damages been awarded on a restitution basis in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969), they would have
exceeded the assets of the corporate defendant by about $150 million. Ruder, Texas Gulf
Sulphur-The Second Round: Privity and State of Mind in Rule lOb-5 Purchase and Sale
Cases, 63 Nw. U.L. REV. 423, 428-29 (1968).
143. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 866 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 976 (1969) (Friendly, J., concurring).
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Further support for the exclusivity of sections 15 and 20(a) can be
drawn from maxims of statutory interpretation adopted in actions brought
under other sections of the Securities Acts. An example of this can be
found in the case of Blau v. Lehman, 144 an action under section 16(b) 145
to recover short-swing profits realized as a result of trading on the basis
of inside information. In Blau, the United States Supreme Court held
that the mere fact that a partner in Lehman Brothers was a director of the
corporation from which the profits were realized was insufficient to
render the partnership liable, absent a finding that the particular partner-
director had suggested the purchase or was deputized to represent
Lehman Brothers on the board of directors. 146 The Court stated that
"[liability under Section 16(b) is to be determined neither by general
partnership law nor by adding to the 'prophylactic' effect Congress itself
clearly prescribed in Section 16(b).''147 The Court reasoned that since
section 16(b) was a restrictive statute with clear limits defining Securities
Act liability, it was intended to be exclusive in its designation of those
against whom an action may be maintained.'
An analogous argument regarding the exclusivity of sections 15 and
20(a) can be asserted. A basic premise underlying the argument is that
specific statutory provisions should be utilized whenever applicable in-
stead of a more general remedy. 14 9 Note also that since the securities
legislation is broad and inclusive, a plaintiff should not be able to bring
an action under federal antifraud provisions and at the same time attempt
to hold a defendant absolutely liable under common law agency princi-
ples in derogation of the specific defenses provided as part of the same
statutory scheme. Liability should only extend to those controlling per-
sons who were in some meaningful sense culpable participants.
150
144. 368 U.S. 403 (1962).
145. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970).
146. 368 U.S. at 409.
147. Id. at 414.
148. Id. at 412.
149. Gilbert v. Nixon, 429 F.2d 348 (10th Cir. 1970). Where it was clear that plaintiff
had a cause of action under § 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77/(2) (1970)
while bringing a lob-5 action, the court based the plaintiff's recovery on § 12(2) declaring:
[A] private action under Rule lOb-5 originated in the need for a sellers remedy where
none had otherwise been provided. Once a remedy was implied for the seller, it was
extended to include the buyer even though relief was already available to him under
Section 12(2). Since in this case recovery is sought under both provisions, we resolve
any conflict between them in favor of Section 12(2), where the statutory remedy is
explicit.
429 F.2d at 355 (footnotes omitted).
150. See notes 121-22 supra and accompanying text.
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The Blau approach has also been applied in the area of lOb-5 litigation
in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores.151 In Blue Chip, as a result
of an antitrust consent decree, Blue Chip Stamps was required to prepare
a prospectus to offer a number of its shares of common stock to retailers
who had Used the stamp service in the past but who were not previously
shareholders in the company. The plaintiffs brought a 10b-5 action
claiming they were dissuaded from purchasing the new stock because the
prospectus was materially misleading in its overly pessimistic appraisal
of Blue Chip's status and future prospects. The Supreme Court denied
standing to these plaintiffs noting that although in the past it had en-
couraged flexible construction of the Acts, 5 2 "[n]o language in either
[section 10(b) or rule lOb-5] speaks at all to the contours of a private
cause of action for their violation."1 53 The Court continued, "[w]hen
Congress wished to provide a remedy to those who neither purchase nor
sell securities, it had little trouble in doing so expressly [in section 16(b)
of the 1934 Act].' 1
Thus, specific statutory provisions should be employed when possible
rather than the more general remedies adopted as a matter of policy and,
by analogy, the specific controlling persons provisions of the Securities
Acts should be utilized rather than the more general remedies under
common law agency principles.
D. Policy Considerations Supportive of the Exclusivity
Position of Sections 15 and 20(a)
Agency principles which impose liability upon an innocent principal
do so simply because such a distribution of loss is commercially and
socially reasonable.155 A multitude of ingenious reasons have been of-
fered to support imputing liability to a principal: he had more or less
"control" over the behavior of the agent;156 he had "set the whole thing
in motion" so he should therefore be responsible for what happens; 57 or
more frankly and cynically, "[i]n hard fact, the real reason for the
employers' liability is [that] the . . . damages are taken from a deep
pocket." 158
151. 421 U.S. 723 (1975), reversing, 492 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1974).
152. Id. at 748-49.
153. Id. at 749.
154. Id. at 734.
155. See generally Comment, Apparent Agency-An Extension of the Deep Pocket
Theory, 23 S.C.L. REV. 826 (1971).
156. See generally T. BATY, VICARIOUS LIABILITY 154 (1916) (discussing common law
bases for vicarious liability).
157. Id.
158. Id.
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Secondary liability, according to the modern justification, is a rule of
policy, a deliberate allocation of the risk. 159 The losses caused by the acts
of an employee, which as a practical matter are sure to occur in the
conduct of the employer's business, have been allocated as a required
cost of doing business. It is reasoned that businesses can better absorb the
costs by distributing them through prices, rates, or liability insurance.
At first glance, it appears justifiable to allocate liability to an employer
where an innocent third party would otherwise be forced to assume the
loss. However, it seems less reasonable to hold a broker vicariously
subject to liability for his employees' violations when the broker has
done everything in its power to prevent the wrongful conduct. In the area
of securities litigation, a principal may be faced with enormous potential
liability predicated upon the wrongful acts of its agents. 160 Under com-
mon law principles, liability may be imputed to an innocent principal
who has neither actually, impliedly, nor apparently authorized an agent's
misrepresentation. 161 While it may be proper to allocate liability as a cost
of doing business in certain contexts, in Securities Acts proceedings,
whether they be administrative or judicial, there is no compelling reason
to allocate liability between two "innocent" parties.
Not only is there no need to impute liability under common law
theories of respondeat superior to a non-culpable principal for the unau-
thorized wrongful conduct of his agents, such imputation runs
counter to the statutory scheme. In 1964, the 1934 Act was amended and
new statutory causes of action were added. 62 The amendments created a
new ground for disciplining a principal-for failure "reasonably to
supervise, with a view to preventing violations,'"-and added a further
provision that no person shall be deemed to have failed reasonably to
supervise if there existed an established and reasonably observed system
of procedures which could be expected to prevent and detect such
violations of other persons.
1 63
159. Id. This justification has been referred to as the real reason for employer's
liability.
160. Judge Friendly, commenting on the potential for damages under rule lOb-5, has
referred to the possibility that unduly expansive imposition of civil liability "will lead to
large judgments, payable in the last analysis by innocent investors, for the benefit of
speculators and their lawyers." SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 867 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 394 U:S. 976 (1969) (Friendly, J., concurring).
161. See note 58 supra and accompanying text.
162. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(5)(E) (1970).
163. Section 15(b)(5)(E) of the 1934 Act provides in part:
For the purposes of this clause (E) no person shall be deemed to have failed reason-
ably to supervise any person, if-
(i) there have been established procedures and a system for applying such proce-
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Application of respondeat superior in this context would not only be
inconsistent with the amendments but would nullify the congressional
intent to make failure to supervise a separate statutory cause of action. 164
Arguably, the new statutory causes of action shifting the burden of
proof165 from that which existed at common law impose unreasonable
responsibilities upon those held strictly liable for their employees' acts.
To compensate employers for the increased likelihood of recovery for
employee wrongful conduct, they should be allowed to rely upon the
good faith defenses of the controlling persons provisions of the Securities
Acts. If principals are not allowed these statutory defenses, they will be
held vicariously liable for their employees' acts even though they have
maintained an adequate system of supervision. If agency principles could
viably be used to impute liability, sanctions would be imposed for failure
to supervise without yielding correlative protection to those who ade-
quately supervise. This would have the effect of* disturbing the delicate
balance between the interests of investors and honest business.
This same sort of inequity would also flow from section 15(b)(5)(E) of
the 1934 Act which makes brokers liable for the unlawful conduct of
their associates. 166 Although the section seems to create the statutory
equivalent of strict liability, this result can be avoided by reading into it
the good faith defenses provided by the controlling persons provisions.
Viewed in light of the administrative history of the 1964 amendments,
this seems to be what Congress intended. The committee reports provide
that "it has never been the practice . . . nor would it be consistent with
our traditions, to punish innocent people for the conduct of another for
which they had no responsibility and of which they had no know-
ledge." 167 Such a policy would seemingly exonerate a broker from
dures, which would reasonably be expected to prevent and detect, insofar as practi-
cable, any such violation by such other person, and
(ii) such person has reasonably discharged the duties and obligations incumbent
upon him by reason of such procedures and system without reasonable cause to
believe that such procedures and system were not being complied with.
164. See 5 Loss, supra note 3, at 3375-76 (Supp. 1969).
165. This shift of burden relieves the purchaser from common law obligations and puts
the burden on the seller. As noted in Stern v. American Bankshares Corp., [Current
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,033, at 91,631 (E.D. Wis. 1977), "[o]nce it is
established that a defendant is a controlling person, the burden shifts to the defendant to
show that he acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the fraudulent
transaction."
166. The phrase "associated with a broker-dealer" was defined by the 1964 amendment
to mean: "any partner, officer, director, or branch manager of such broker or dealer. ..
or any person directly or indirectly controlling or controlled by such broker or dealer,
including any employee of such broker or dealer .
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(18) (1970).
167. S. REP. No. 379, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. 77 (1963).
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liability for his associates' violations where an adequate supervisory
system was employed, and further reinforces the argument that the
control provisions provide the exclusive means for imputing vicarious
liability.
Another argument supporting the exclusivity position of sections 15
and 20(a) relates to a compromise between the public interest and the
obligation to supervise thoroughly. The 1933 and the 1934 Acts have
been recognized as a compromise between the interests of the investing
public and those of the business community. 68 It has been suggested that
the controlling persons provisions were enacted to extend liability to
those agency situations where strict application of agency principles
would preclude liability169 -a position which fails to perceive or deal
adequately with the extensive obligations which would be imposed
upon controlling persons. A separate cause of action was adopted for
failure to supervise, reflecting a congressional design to promote more
rigorous supervisory standards and arguably suggesting that, with respect
to the "public interest," a controlling person's prime obligation is to
supervise. Accordingly, the "control" duties should be limited to careful
hiring practices and adequate supervisory procedures which are directed
toward the detection of employee fraud.
The proponents of "agency principles" who argue that the imposition
of strict liability in the securities field will have a deterrent effect on
fraudulent conduct fail to perceive the existing stringent rules to which
brokerage firms are already subjected, including the rules of the SEC, 7 '
the various exchanges, 7' and the National Association of Securities
Dealers (NASD).172 Such firms, required by regulation to hire careful-
ly 173 and supervise thoroughly, 74 are already forced to do everything in
their power to prevent securities law violations by their employees. With
regard to this group of litigants, it seems highly unlikely that the imposi-
tion of strict liability will serve any purpose in deterring fraudulent
conduct. Furthermore, if the ostensible agency-respondeat superior prin-
ciples were utilized in conjunction with the controlling persons provi-
168. See note 112 supra and accompanying text.
169. Comment, The Controlling Persons Provisions: Conduits of Secondary Liability
Under Federal Securities Law, 19 VILL. L. REV. 621, 626 (1974).
170. Comment, Conflicting Duties of Brokerage Firms, 88 HARV. L. REV. 396, 398
(1974).
171. See NATIONAL ASS'N SEC. DEALERS MANUAL (CCH 1971); see, e.g., New York
Stock Exchange Rule 345.
172. See NATIONAL ASS'N SEC. DEALERS MANUAL (CCH 1971).
173. See, e.g., New York Stock Exchange Rule 345.
174. See, e.g., American Stock Exchange Rule 340.
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sions, the controlling persons provisions would be useless due to the
emasculation of the good faith defense.
Rather than impeding the efforts of Congress by imposing liability
without fault, if the courts simply interpreted the good faith defense to
require high supervisory standards, strict liability could virtually be
imposed where the courts deemed its imposition necessary. If this ap-
proach were adopted, the courts could continue balancing the interests of
the public and honest business as envisioned by the Securities Acts.
VI. CONCLUSION
For the past forty years, the courts have been confronted with a
multitude of problems in attempting to reconcile inconsistent theories of
securities regulation. Although the judiciary has repeatedly faced the
question of whether the controlling persons provisions afford the exclu-
sive means of imputing vicarious liability, or whether liability may also
be predicated upon common law principles of agency, the question is
unresolved, as a distinct split has emerged in those circuits which have
confronted the issue. As evidenced by the Hochfelder decision, liability
predicated upon mere negligence is decidedly inappropriate, which sug-
gests that the Supreme Court is shifting the delicate balance between
investor protection and business interests away from standards of strict
liability. The language of the controlling persons provisions, as well as
the legislative intent surrounding the securities enactments, compels the
conclusion that the Securities Acts have supplanted vicarious liability
under the traditional common law agency theories.
Dennis H. Johnston
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